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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant replies to th2 arguments raised by Respondent in its 
Brief (hereafter, "Brief") as follows: 
1. Respondent has argued: 
The Uniform Act on Paternity does not create a new 
cause of action that did not exist previously, it 
merely establishes a procedural mechanism for the en-
forcement of a child's long recognized right of care 
and support from its father . . (Brief, p. 2.) 
The inference is that no substantive state law has been broken by 
Appellant-defendant; and, therefore, Appellant may not seek juris-
diction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-16(1) of 
the Juvenile Court Act. 
Appellant replies: On the contrary, the Utah Uniform Act on 
Paternity specifically creates a cause of action. It is under this 
act that the State of Utah [Respondent] has been able to become a 
party to this paternity action (Section 78-45a-2, U.C.A. (1953)). 
Moreover, the Uniform Act on Paternity specifically establishes 
the father's responsibility for the costs of the mother's preg-
nancy and confinement (Ibid., Section 78-45a-l; Complaint, para-
graph 6); for the costs of the child's education and funeral 
78-45a-l, U.C.A. (1953)); and, arguably, for certain or 
all costs incurred in bringing an action such as the present one 
(Ibid., Section 78-45a-9; Complaint, Prayer, paragraph 7). Thus, 
the state law in question is more than procedural: it is substan-
tive. And its violation properly triggers the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-1G (1), U.C.A. (1953). 
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2. Respondent has argued: ''Appel l.-J.nl has not bt'r'n 
charged with viola ting any la1·J or ordin<:rnce. " (Brief, µ. 4.) 
Appellant replies: Respondent's semantics are unconvinciny. 
For example, paragraphs G and 7 of the Complaint a 
number of Appellant's asserted "failures" to have complied 
with the requirements of Section 78-45a-l of the Uniform Act 
on Paternity. Thus, Appellant has been charged with the vio-
lation of a substantive state law. 
3. Respondent has argued: The present litigation con-
cerns, not the violation of a law or ordinance, but "simply 
the enforcement of Appellant's moral obligation to support his 
child." (Brief, p. 4.) 
Appellant replies: Moral obligations are not enforceable 
in a court of law; laws are enforceable in a court of law. But 
here, two laws con£lict with each other. Against that context, 
perhaps, it may be appropriate for a court to consider the 
moral obligations from which, ultimately, those two laws derive. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity derives from the parents' obliga-
tion to nurture their offspring. The Juvenile Court Act derives 
from an equally basic moral imperative. It derives from the 
obligation of humankind to socialize its successor generations--
to salvage its young, not only from neglect and abuse, but to 
salvage its young from the inevitable errors and deficiencies 
of youth itself. In his appeal, Appellant does not shy away 
from the issue raised by Respondent. Rather, he urges the 
Court to ponder the moral underpinnings of the two conflicting 
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laws--and to conclude that the higher moral obligation is to try 
to salvage a boy and that the lower moral obligation is to visit 
on a man protracted punishment (called "responsibility") for the 
senseless act of a child. 
4. Alternatively, Respondent has argued that Section 78-3a-
16(1) of the Juvenile Court Act establishes jurisdiction in the 
juvenile courts where only a criminal law has been violated. 
Respondent has supported its position with three observations. 
(a) First, Respondent has cited Section 78-3a-39 of the Juvenile 
Court Act, whose "list of possible dispositions of a case within 
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court" presumably shows a statu-
tory intent that the juvenile court deal with violations of only 
criminal laws and ordinances. (Brief, p. 3.) 
Appellant replies: In its Brief, Respondent cited five sub-
paragraphs of Section 78-Ja-39. But other subparagraphs of the 
same section show that the juvenile court possesses wide latitude 
to guide children who have encountered all sorts of difficulties--
including that particular difficulty confronting Appelant today: 
(10) The court may order that the child be examined 
or treated by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or 
psychologist, or that he receive other special care 
(13) In support of a decree under section 78-Ja-16 
the court may make an order setting forth reasonable 
conditions to be complied with ... including . 
restrictions on the child's associates, occupation, 
and other activities, and requirements to be ob-
served by the parents or custodian. 
(17) The court may make any other reasonable orders 
which are for the best interest of the child or 
are required for the protection of the public. 
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(b) Secondly, Respondent has Appellant's rEfer-
ences to other states whose statutes, like Utah's, assign broad 
jurisdiction to the juvenile courts. Respondent has asserted 
that all such statutes assign jurisdiction where only a criminal 
law has been violated. (Brief, p. 4.) 
Appellant replies: Admittedly, certain states, by statute, 
limit the jurisdiction of their juvenile courts to violations of 
only criminal laws. But there are other states--including Utah--
whose statutes extend that jurisdiction to instances where any 
state law has been broken. These two basically contrasting sets 
of statutes exist among the states. It is reasonable, therefore, 
where any one of these statutes is to be interpreted, that it be 
interpreted to mean precisely what it says--and not to mean what 
the opposite set says. This is all the more true because Utah 
has foregone an eighteen-year opportunity (since the passage of 
its Juvenile Court Act in 1965) to amend its statute to restrict 
the jurisdiction of its juvenile courts. 
(c) Thirdly, to test the aptness of Appellant's broad read-
ing of Section 78-3a-16(1) (i.e., that it refers to violations 
of all laws, civil as well as criminal), Respondent would apply 
Appellant's [mis]interpretation to circumstances where a child 
has breached other non-criminal statutes, such as unlawful 
detainer, wrongful death, or products liability. (Brief, p. 5.) 
As argued by Respondent, Appellant fails the test. 
Appellant replies: Essentially, Appellant's reading of 
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the ,;tatutc creates no problems. But wherever his interpretation 
may lead to an absurdity, his interpretation should not be followed 
in that particular application. (The single instance among the 
cited examples would be the wrongful death statute.) On the 
other hand, where his interpretation of the statute does not lead 
to an absurdity, it should be followed; because his interpretation 
is closest to the literal meaning of the statute and closest, 
also, to the spirit of the statute. 
(d) Fourthly, Respondent has cited State v. Dung Jo, 585 P.2d 
464 (Utah, 1978), to support its contention that violations of 
only a criminal law may trigger juvenile court jurisdiction. 
Appellant replies: In Dung Jo this Court held that, at the 
relevant time, there existed no Utah law prohibiting a child from 
running away from home. Thus, as Respondent itself has admitted, 
"the actions of the minor child were violations of no law . 
and jurisdiction of the juvenile court was properly denied. (Brief, 
p. 5.) In the case at bar, however, Appellant's asserted siring 
of a child whom he has failed to support clearly does violate the 
Utah Uniform Act on Paternity. Therefore--and consistently--, 
jurisdiction should now be exercised by the juvenile court. 
5. Lastly, Respondent has argued: In setting a parent's 
support obligation dollar-amounts, the district court, pursuant 
to Section 78-45-7 (2), U.C.A. (1953), "must consider all relevant 
factors." (Brief, p. 6.) The inference is that a juvenile court 
can exercise no more flexibility than the district court; and, 
therefore, the instant appeal for transfer to the juvenile court 
-5-
is futile. 
Appellant replies: The relevant factors set forth in Soct100 
78-45-7(2) and intended to guide the district court in a case 
such as this are all, save one, framed in financial terms. 1 In 
any event, the relevant factors of Section 78-45-7 do not envision 
the age, immaturity or emotional problems of the parent at the 
time the parent engendered the offspring. Nor do they embrace 
the likely psychological and social repercussions upon a child-
parent when faced with prospective liability continuing for 
eighteen years [minimum]. On the other hand, the juvenile court 
is free to consider these very factors. Unlike the district 
court, the juvenile court is mandated by law to devise a reso-
lution, not only that will serve the best interests of the 
1. Factor (f) refers to the "age of the parties." In con-
text the reference appears to be to the age of the obligee or 
child. 
In further rebuttal to Respondent's citing of Section 78-45-
7, Appellant respectfully refers the Court to Subsection 78-45-
7(3), which requires the district court to "determine and 
assess all arrear ages based upon, but not limited to: (a) 
the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if 
any; (b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily 
expended in support of spouse and children." 
Appellant asks: Does this not mean that, while Appellant 
remains an unemancipated child and/or student supported by his 
family, the mother of the offspring will continue to draw 
public assistance as she already has done (Complaint, 
2, 9, 10, 11); and, finally, when Appellant does become self-
supporting, the court must back-assess him for all previous 
welfare expenditures, in addition to requiring him to muke 
ongoing support payments? Is this the sort of equituble, humane 
and relevant judicial determination that the respondent State_ 
of Utah would hold out to the Court in defense of its position' 
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state, but that will serve the welfare of this child-Appellant, 
as w211.
2 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellant urges this Court to reverse 
the district court's Order and to transfer jurisdiction in the 
instant matter to the appropriate juvenile court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this ;:!,1_ day of June, 1983. 
JO N E. HRVEY 
Attorney for Defbndant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of the 
above pleading to Sandy Mooy, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent, c/o Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 4th South, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this '23 day of June, 
1983. 
2. Paraphrasing in part Section 78-3a-l, U.C.A. (1953), which 
section sets forth the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act. 
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